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MAPP AFTER FORTY YEARS: 
ITS IMPACT ON RACE IN AMERICA 
Lewis R. Katz t 
The facts in Mapp v. Ohio1 were not unusual. White plain-clothes 
police officers, looking for a man suspected of bombing Don King's 
home, surrounded Dollree Mapp's house, an Mrican-American 
woman known to the police, when the suspect's car was found parked 
outside the house. They knocked on the door, but Mapp denied them 
entrance without a search warrant. The officers radioed for a warrant, 
but presumably without waiting for one, detectives accompanied by 
six uniformed officers broke out the front glass of the door, entered, 
and searched the house. The lead detective told her he had a warrant 
and waved a piece of paper in her face, a paper which she allegedly 
grabbed and stuffed in her blouse. After handcuffing Mapp, the offi-
cers retrieved the paper, but no warrant was offered at trial.2 While 
the suspect was not found in the house, the officers found pencil 
sketches of male and female nudes packed in a box and suitcase in 
Mapp's bedroom. Mapp was charged with possession of obscene 
materials, a felony. Even if there had been a warrant to search for the 
suspected bomber, it would not have extended to a box and suitcase in 
which he could not have been hiding. 
The search without a warrant and without exigent circumstances 
that might have excused the absence of a warrant violated the defen-
dant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. At the time of the search, 1957, Ohio courts offered 
1 John C. Hutchins Professor and Director, L.L.M. United States Legal Studies, Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law. The author thanks Robert L. Wagner, J.D. 2001, 
for his invaluable research assistance. 
I 367 U.S. 643,643-45 (1961). 
2 See State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Ohio 1960), rev'd Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961) ("No warrant was offered in evidence, there was no testimony as to who issued any 
warrant or as to what any warrant contained, and the absence from evidence of any such warrant 
is not explained or otherwise accounted for in the record."). See also Stanley Kent & Michael 
von Glahn, Dollree Mapp v. State of Ohio, CLEV. MAG. LANDMARK L. SUPP. 36, 38 (Mar. 
1998) ("In the 1970s, Delau [one of the detectives] admitted-contradicting his trial testi-
mony-that his lieutenant had only obtained an affidavit [not a warrant], which spelled out the 
reasons for wanting to secure a warrant."). 
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little protection to Fourth Amendment rights. 3 Nine years earlier, the 
United States Supreme Court had held that the Fourth Amendment 
protections that applied to the federal government were also binding 
upon the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.4 In federal 
courts since 1914, the remedy for violation of Fourth Amendment 
rights had been exclusion of the evidence from the prosecution's 
case.5 However, the Court said that the states were not bound by that 
rule. 6 Ohio, and about two-thirds of the other states, had not adopted 
at that time an exclusionary rule for constitutional violations under 
their own constitutions.7 Thus, in about two-thirds of the states, po-
lice were free to violate fundamental constitutional rights without 
consequences. When reviewing the search in this case, the Ohio Su-
preme Court acknowledged the constitutional violation but stated that 
this court has held that evidence obtained by an unlawful 
search and seizure is admissible in a criminal prosecution .... 
[A]nd the Supreme Court of the United States has held that 
the Constitution of the United States does not usually prevent 
a state court from so holding. 
Hence, we conclude that . . . the due process clause of the 
14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was 
not violated by defendant's conviction, although that convic-
tion was based primarily upon the introduction in evidence of 
3 See, e.g., State v. Lindway, 2 N.E.2d 490, 493 (Ohio 1936) ("It is well settled that the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution ... are directed exclusively 
against the activities of the federal government and have no application to the various states and 
their agencies."). 
4 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), overruled in part by Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643 (1961) ("The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-
which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit 
in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the Due 
Process Clause."). 
5 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) ("We therefore reach the conclu-
sion that the letters in question were taken from the house of the accused ... in direct violation 
of the constitutional rights of the defendant; ... there was involved ... a denial of the constitu-
tional rights of the accused, and that the court should have restored these letters to the ac-
cused."). See also Wolf, 338 U.S. at 28 ("In Weeks v. United States, ... this Court held that in a 
federal prosecution the Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an illegal 
search and seizure. This ruling was made for the first time in 1914."). 
6 See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 33 ("We hold, therefore, that in a prosecution in a State court for 
a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by 
an unreasonable search and seizure."). 
7 See id. at 38 tbi.I (summarizing the position of the states regarding the Weeks doctrine 
in !949). 
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books and pictures unlawfully seized during an unlawful 
search of defendant's home. 8 
473 
The illegal entry of Mapp's house by the police was nothing ex-
traordinary; it was an everyday fact of life for blacks and other racial 
minorities. Police throughout America were part of the machinery of 
keeping blacks "in their place," ignoring constitutional guarantees 
against unreasonable arrests and searches and those that barred use of 
"third-degree" tactics when questioning suspects.9 The Constitution 
played little role in the relationship between blacks and the police, 
and the black population had little power at the time to seek redress 
through the political process. 
The primary story running through the four hundred years of 
American civilization is race-the ongoing story of white mistreat-
8 State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387, 389-90 (Ohio 1960), rev'd, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961). 
9 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). The Supreme Court reversed the con-
viction of the accused, a black man, who was found guilty and sentenced to death for murdering 
a white man. The summary of the facts of the case outlines the brutal methods police often used 
to extract confessions: 
On that night one Dial, a deputy sheriff, accompanied by others, came to the home 
of Ellington, one of the defendants, and requested him to accompany them to the 
house of the deceased, and there a number of white men were gathered, who began 
to accuse the defendant of the crime. Upon his denial they seized him, and with the 
participation of the deputy they hanged him by a rope to the limb of a tree, and hav-
ing let him down, they hung him again, and when he was let down the second time, 
and he still protested his innocence, he was tied to a tree and whipped, and still de-
clining to accede to the demands that he confess, he was finally released and he re-
turned with some difficulty to his home, suffering intense pain and agony. . . . A 
day or two thereafter the said deputy, accompanied by another, returned to the home. 
of the said defendant and arrested him, and departed with the prisoner towards the 
jail in an adjoining county, but went by a route which led into the State of Alabama; 
and while on the way, in that State, the deputy stopped and again severely whipped 
the defendant, declaring that he would continue the whipping until he confessed, and 
the defendant then agreed to confess to such a statement as the deputy would dictate, 
and he did so, after which he was delivered to jail. 
The other two defendants, Ed Brown and Henry Shields, were also arrested 
and taken to the same jail. ... (T]he same deputy, accompanied by a number of 
white men, one of whom was also an officer, and by the jailer, came to the jail, and 
the two last named defendants were made to strip and they were laid over chairs and 
their backs were cut to pieces with a leather strap with buckles on it, and they were 
likewise made by the said deputy definitely to understand that the whipping would 
be continued unless and until they confessed, and not only confessed, but confessed 
in every matter of detail as demanded by those present; and in this manner the de-
fendants confessed the crime, and as the whippings progressed and were repeated, 
they changed or adjusted their confession in all particulars of detail so as to conform 
to the demands of their torturers . 
. . . The facts are not only undisputed, they are admitted, and admitted to have 
been done by officers of the state, in conjunction with other participants, and all this 
was definitely well known to everybody connected with the trial, and during the 
trial, including the state's prosecuting attorney and the trial judge presiding. 
/d. at 281-85 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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ment of other races-red, black, and yellow. The history of blacks 
and whites in America is the tale of black enslavement, murder, and 
rape, and later the legitimization of under-class citizenship with its 
lingering legacies of slavery. This includes arbitrary deprivation of 
the most basic human rights, including life itself, notwithstanding the 
commitments of the post-Civil War amendments. At every stage of 
the first two hundred and fifty years of the Republic, all three 
branches of the federal government were, at the least, accomplices to 
these policies. The framers legitimized human slavery and chose to 
reward the slave states. Even the (delayed) ban on importation of 
slaves enriched slave holders by increasing the value of their slaves, 10 
and the three-fifths rule increased the slave states' power in the new 
Republic. n Congress, traditionally, was the power base in the na-
tional government of the southern interests, except during the short 
period of Reconstruction when the Radical Republicans held sway. 12 
Using the strangle-hold of seniority and the filibuster in the Senate, 
southern representatives to the House and Senate into the mid-
twentieth century made sure that legislation seeking relief from injus-
tices for blacks rarely made it to the floor, and, if it did, they made 
sure it died there. Although more than 4, 700 Americans, the over-
whelming majority black, were lynched by mobs between the end of 
the 1882 and 1968, 13 Congress never passed anti-lynching legislation. 
Even after Brown v. Board of Education, 14 in 1954, almost all of the 
southerners in the United States Senate and House of Representatives 
issued a document, the Southern Manifesto, denouncing the Supreme 
Court decision and calling for massive resistance. This indicated that 
enlightenment was no closer to power in the South than it had been a 
century earlier. 15 
Nor could the black population look to the White House for help. 
In the years after the Civil War, President Hayes removed federal 
troops from the former Confederate states. He effectively abandoned 
10 See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 98-101 (4th ed. 1974) (dis-
cussing debates during the Constitutional Convention about the slave trade, its effect on the 
value of existing slaves, and the ultimate compromise reached in Article I, Section 9 of the 
Constitution). 
11 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be appor-
tioned among the several States ... according to their respective Numbers, which shall be de-
termined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, ... three fifths of all other Persons."). 
12 See FRANKLIN, supra note 10, at 252-67 (discussing the rise and eventual fall in politi-
cal power of the Radical Republicans just after the Civil War). 
13 See JAMES ALLEN ET AL., WITHOUT SANCfUARY: LYNCHING PHOTOGRAPHY IN AMER-
ICA 12 (2000). 
14 347 u.s. 483,500 (1954). 
15 See 102 CONG. REc. 4460-61, 4515-16 (1956) (showing that only Senators Albert 
Gore, Sr. and Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, and Lyndon Baines Johnson of Texas did not sign 
the Manifesto). 
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the African-American population in those states to reactionary forces, 
which recreated slavery in everything but name. 16 President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt was so timid when it came to race that he would not 
even support anti-lynching legislation in Congress for fear of alienat-
ing the powerful southern congressionalleadership. 17 
In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court added its imprima-
tur to white supremacy. In Dred Scott v. Sanford/ 8 the Court held 
that a Negro "whose ancestors were imported into this country, and 
sold as slaves," even when emancipated, could not be a citizen of the 
United States and was not entitled to the privileges of citizenship, in-
cluding access to the courts to sue to protect his freedom. 19 Forty 
years later, the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson20 endorsed Jim 
Crow laws and the separation of the races, which stood as a bar to 
equality for half a century more. 
Finally, at the mid-point of the last century, the black population 
found a branch of the federal government willing to consider its is-
sues. The Supreme Court, under the stewardship of Chief Justice Earl 
Warren, set out to eliminate the legal structure that perpetuated apart-
heid in America. While at the outset the Court did not have the sup-
port of the other branches of the federal government, World War ll 
had a remarkable effect upon the American public. The Court's ini-
tial statements on fairness and equality found support from a substan-
tial percentage of the American public, except in the South and in the 
southern leadership in the Congress. 
When it comes to cases that stamp the Warren Court era, all deal 
directly or indirectly with race. Brown v. Board of Education21 im-
posed the racial equality principle upon our society and, once and for 
all, eliminated the legal basis for racial segregation. Baker v. Carr22 
furthered equality in our representative democracy. Mapp v. Ohio23 
stands out as the third hallmark case, beginning the transformation of 
the constitutional ideal of due process into a living reality and leading 
the way for the transformation of due process that followed. Justice 
Walter V. Schaefer of the Illinois Supreme Court described Brown, 
16 See FRANKLJN, supra note 10, at 267 (discussing the presidential campaign of 1876 and 
the compromise reached between the Republicans and Democrats regarding federal troops in the 
South). 
17 See T.H. WATKINS, THE HUNGRY YEARS 498-99 (1999) (discussing the attempts by 
some members of Congress to pass an anti-lynching bill and its ultimate failure due to a filibus-
ter by southern senators). 
18 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
19 /d. at 403. 
20 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
21 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
22 369 u.s. 186,237 (1962). 
23 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
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Baker, and the due process revolution initiated by Mapp as a process 
of putting flesh and blood on our ideals. 24 
The Supreme Court procedure in Mapp, as well as the outcome, 
provoked consternation and disagreement. Although the defendant in 
the state court had moved to suppress the evidence illegally seized as 
a result of a warrantless entry of her home, the Ohio Supreme Court 
reiterated its prior holding that "evidence obtained by an unlawful 
search and seizure is admissible in a criminal prosecution."25 United 
States Supreme Court precedent supported that holding. In Wolf v. 
Colorado, 26 the Supreme Court held that an illegal search and seizure 
violated a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, but tpe federal rule 
requiring exclusion of such evidence was inapplicable to the states. 27 
In just twelve years, state support for the proposition of law advanced 
in Wolf had eroded. The national trend, evidenced by state court de-
cisions, was toward rejection of Wolf and adoption of the exclusion-
ary rule as a matter of state law.28 A dissenting justice of the Ohio 
Supreme Court indicated that state courts were "now about evenly 
divided," which evidenced a sea change in the twelve years since the 
Wolfdecision. 29 
How the United States Supreme Court came to decide the Fourth 
Amendment issue has long been an issue of contention and lore in 
Cleveland legal circles. Judge Jack Day, in this Symposium, tells us 
how the issue made it to the Supreme Court as a side issue in the 
ACLU's amicus brief. 30 The Justices themselves disagreed as to 
whether the issue had been properly raised. 
The majority conceded that the appellant "chose to urge what 
may have appeared to be the surer ground for favorable disposition 
and did not insist that Wolf be overruled," and that it was the amicus 
24 See Walter V. Schaefer, Panelists' Comments, 54 KY. L.J. 521 (1966). Responding 
during a symposium on poverty, equality, and the administration of criminal justice, Justice 
Schaefer commented that: 
!d. 
Flesh and blood are being put on our ideals. This is true, for example, with respect 
to Brown v. Board of Education. This is true with respect to Baker v. Carr, and is 
true in all areas of criminal procedure. And putting flesh and blood-coming face-
to-face with our ideals and looking them in the teeth-is not always a comfortable 
process, nor is it always an easy one. 
25 State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Ohio 1960), rev'd, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961). 
26 338 u.s. 25 (1949). 
27 See id. at 33. 
28 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) ("While in 1949, ... almost two-thirds of 
the States were opposed to the use of the exclusionary rule, now, despite the Wolf case, more 
than half of those since passing upon it, by their own legislative or judicial decision, have 
wholly or partly adopted or adhered to the Weeks rule."). 
29 Mapp, 166 N.E.2d at 394 (Herbert, J., dissenting). 
30 See Jack Day, Words That Counted-A Vignette, 51 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 373 (2001). 
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curiae who urged the Court to overrule Wolf 31 That "surer" argument 
was a request that the Court declare the Ohio obscenity statute, under 
which Dollree Mapp had been charged and convicted, unconstitu-
tiona1.32 The majority said the issue was initially raised in the Su-
preme Court by the ACLU's amicus brief. While that is true, dissent-
ing Justice Harlan pointed out that the issue was raised in the ACLU's 
brief "in one short concluding paragraph of its argument 're-
quest[ing]' the Court to re-examine and overrule Wolf, but without 
argumentation."33 He further pointed out that Mapp's attorney raised 
the question as a subordinate issue, not even citing to Wolf, and in 
oral argument "expressly disavowed" any purpose to have Wolf over-
ruled. 34 Justice Harlan's purpose was to demonstrate how the Court 
had violated its own long-held principles in reaching out to decide an 
issue that the parties had not focused upon. 35 
The exclusionary rule seems to have that effect upon the United 
States Supreme Court. Twenty years after Mapp, when the Rehnquist 
Court was looking to emasculate the exclusionary rule, the Court 
reached out in Illinois v. Gates. 36 After oral argument in Illinois v. 
Gates, the Court restored the case to its docket for the following term 
and ordered the parties to brief and argue whether the exclusionary 
rule should be modified, an issue that had never been raised by either 
party in the life of the case. It was only after both parties returned 
and argued the following year that any modification to the exclusion-
ary rule would be irrelevant to their case that the Court, "with apolo-
gies to all," relented and reserved the issue for another day. 37 That 
31 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 646 n.3. 
32 See id. at 672-73. 
33 !d. at 674 n.5 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
34 See id. at n.6. 
35 See id. at 674-75 ("In this posture of things, I think it fair to say that five members of 
this Court have simply 'reached out' to overrule Wolf. With all respect for the views of the 
majority ... I can perceive no justification for regarding this case as an appropriate occasion for 
re-examining Wolf."). 
36 462 u.s. 213 (1983). 
37 See id. at 217. In the beginning paragraphs of the opinion, Justice Rehnquist outlined 
the procedural history of the case. 
We granted certiorari to consider the application of the Fourth Amendment to 
a magistrate's issuance of a search warrant on the basis of a partially corroborated 
anonymous informant's tip. After receiving briefs and hearing oral argument on this 
question, however, we requested the parties to address an additional question: 
"[W)hether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal trial of evidence 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, should to any extent be 
modified, so as, for example, not to require the exclusion of evidence ob-
tained in the reasonable belief that the search and seizure at issue was 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment." 
We decide today, with apologies to all, that the issue we framed for the par-
ties was not presented to the lllinois courts and, accordingly, do not address it. 
Rather, we consider the question originally presented in the petition for certiorari, 
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day came one week later, when the Court docketed three cases for its 
1983-84 Term in which the proposed modification had been urged at 
trial and argued on appeal. Two of those cases were decided a year 
later, inaugurating the so-called "good faith" exception to the exclu-
sionary mle. 38 
With the decision in Mapp and the application of the exclusionary 
rule to the states, the due process revolution and its reshaping of 
American criminal justice was off to the races. Mapp led the way 
when it held that the Fourth Amendment right "is enforceable against 
[the states] ... by the same sanction ... as is used against the 
[f]ederal [g]overnment."39 Justice Clark's rationale for enforcing the · 
core right against the states the same way it was enforced against the 
federal government became the rule as other core rights contained in 
the Bill of Rights were made applicable to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: 
Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the as-
surance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures 
would be "a form of words," valueless and undeserving of 
mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, 
so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of 
privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its 
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of 
coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high re~ard as 
a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 
and conclude that the Illinois Supreme Court read the requirements of our Fourth 
Amendment decisions too restrictively. 
/d. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
38 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) ("We conclude that the marginal 
or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable 
reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of 
exclusion."); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (applying the good-faith excep-
tion created in Leon and reversing the exclusion of the evidence). The Sheppard Court con-
cluded: 
In sum, the police conduct in this case clearly was objectively reasonable and 
largely error-free. An error of constitutional dimensions may have been committed 
with respect to the issuance of the warrant, but it was the judge, not the police offi-
cers, who made the critical mistake. . . . Suppressing evidence because the judge 
failed to make all the necessary clerical corrections despite his assurances that such 
changes would be made will not serve the deterrent function that the exclusionary 
rule was designed to achieve. Accordingly, federal law does not require the exclu-
sion of the disputed evidence in this case. 
Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 990-9!. A third case, Colorado v. Quintero, 463 U.S. 1206 (1983), 
raised the issue of whether a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should be ap-
plied to searches conducted without warrants. Quintero died before the case was argued, 
mooting the case, and the specific issue has never been addressed by the Supreme Court. 
39 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. 
40 /d. 
2001] MAPP' S IMPACT ON RACE 479 
This universal rule was restated in another Clark majority opinion 
two years later.41 It was stated that the right, once applied to the 
states, would be interpreted by "the same constitutional standard" as 
used in interpreting the federal right.42 
This became the standard as Mapp led the way when making 
other rights of the Bill of Rights binding on the states. By the end of 
the Warren Court, almost all of the protections of the Bill of Rights 
applying to criminal cases had been made binding on the states, the 
only exception being the Fifth Amendment protection guaranteeing 
the initiation of criminal proceedings by grand jury indictment. Fol-
lowing closely on Mapp, the Court made the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination,43 the Sixth Amendment rights to 
counsel,44 to a speedy and public trial,45 to confrontation of hostile 
witnesses, 46 and to compulsory process to obtain witness testimony, 47 
and the Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive bai148 ap-
plicable to the states. Finally, the Warren Court incorporated the 
double jeopardy prohibition into the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause,49 overruling Palko v. Connecticut,50 where the incor-
poration debate had begun. These rights came over to state criminal 
proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment to be enforced the 
same as they would in federal criminal cases. 
The road since Mapp has been strewn with obstacles and road-
blocks. The subsequent forty years is filled with the Court's devel-
opment of limitations on Mapp. The exclusionary rule is inapplicable 
to grand jury proceedings,51 most sentencings as well as parole and 
probation revocation proceedings, 52 collateral IRS proceedings fol-
lowing upon state criminal cases,53 and deportation hearings.54 Two 
crippling limitations followed. In Stone v. Powell,55 the Supreme 
41 SeeKer v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). 
42 /d. at 30. See also id. at 33 ("This Court's long-established recognition that standards 
of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment are not susceptible of Procrustean application is 
carried forward when that Amendment's proscriptions are enforced against the States through 
the Fourteenth Amendment"). 
43 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). 
44 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 342 (1963). 
45 See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213,223 (1967). 
46 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,403 (1965). 
47 See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
48 See Schilb v. Kuehel, 404 U.S. 357,365 (1971). 
49 See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). 
50 302 U.S. 319,328 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
51 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974). 
52 See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998). 
53 See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976). 
54 See JNS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984). 
55 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
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Court held that Fourth Amendment issues may not be raised in federal 
habeas corpus actions if the defendant had a "full and fair opportu-
nity" to litigate the Fourth Amendment issue in the state criminal pro-
ceeding, even if the state courts incorrectly decided the Fourth 
Amendment issue. 56 That decision eliminated federal oversight of 
state court decisions onFourth Amendment issues, except for certio-
rari petitions to the Supreme Court, which in the early years after 
Mapp was so useful in persuading recalcitrant state courts to enforce 
Fourth Amendment rights. Finally, in 1984, the Supreme Court 
adopted the so-called "good faith" exception, holding that the exclu-
sionary rule is inapplicable to searches where police in good faith rea-
sonably rely upon an invalid search warrant.57 All of these decisions 
are based upon the premise that the exclusionary rule is not a consti-
. tutional right, and that the singular reason for the exclusionary rule is 
to deter illegal police behavior. This premise, however, rejects the 
underlying rationale of both Weeks v. United States and Mapp v. 
Ohio, namely that the exclusionary rule is part and parcel of the 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 58 
I. MAPP AND THE MESSAGE 
Notwithstanding the limitations imposed upon the exclusionary 
rule in the ensuing years, the spirit of the Mapp decision continues to 
come through loud and clear. Mapp' s message is that the government 
must obey the law while enforcing it. If the government fails to do 
so, and in so doing violates the rights of citizens to be free from un-
reasonable searches and seizures, this violation will result in denying 
the government the use of the fruits of its illegality to prove that the 
citizen has committed a crime. This commitment involves making 
unavailable, at least in the prosecution's case in chief, reliable evi-
dence of guilt. It results in a collateral issue-the conduct of the gov-
ernment in obtaining the evidence of guilt-taking precedence over 
56 !d. at 494-95. 
57 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 
u.s. 981,990-91 (1984). 
58 Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (holding "that the exclusionary rule 
is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments"), and Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383,394 (1914) (noting that to sanction the unlawful invasion by officers of the 
law of a person's horne "would be to afflilll by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an 
open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people 
against such unauthorized action"), with Stone, 428 U.S. at 486 ('The primary justification for 
the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment 
rights. Post-Mapp decisions have established that the rule is not a personal constitutional 
right."), and United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) ("[f]he [exclusionary] rule is 
a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through 
its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."). 
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the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 59 In so doing, it sends an im-
portant message: We place greater value on ensuring that the gov-
ernment does not violate the fundamental rights of its citizens than we 
do on convicting the guilty defendant in those cases where the evi-
dence is the result of a Fourth Amendment violation. 
Every time a motion to suppress based upon a Fourth Amendment 
violation is filed in a criminal case, the stage is set for retesting that 
commitment to protecting individual rights and the social value of 
holding the government to a high standard even if a guilty defendant 
goes free. That is often the case when evidence is suppressed. There 
is a tremendous cost when a guilty defendant goes free, and society's 
willingness to absorb that cost constantly waivers. It is this cost that 
has rallied opponents to the exclusionary rule for decades. 
There are limits to the effects of the message. The exclusionary 
rule only works in those cases where police are concerned that evi-
dence discovered during an intrusion will be available at a subsequent 
trial. If there is no concern about the use of evidence, then the exclu-
sionary rule will have no deterrent effect upon police. For example, if 
a police stop is designed to harass an individual or a member of a 
group, the officer will not be concerned about a subsequent determi-
nation that the stop or arrest was illegal. Worse are those situations 
where a police officer is willing to commit perjury at a suppression 
hearing about the circumstances surrounding a stop, arrest, or search. 
The existence of an exclusionary rule is meaningless to the perjuring 
officer because she will manufacture facts to bring herself within the 
law's requirements. Further, the message is lost when trial judges 
deny motions to suppress pro forma regardless of the facts. 
Despite the limitations on the message imposed by the limits on 
the exclusionary rule set by the Supreme Court, the perjurious testi-
mony of certain police officers, and the failure of some trial judges to 
enforce the Constitution as they have sworn to do, the exclusionary 
rule survives and has helped to strengthen the American people's 
view of themselves as free citizens in a free society. The self-
confidence that comes with the knowledge that there are limitations 
on how government may behave strengthens individual security and 
invigorates individual willingness to take risks. The absence of self-
confidence causes individuals to withdraw from society and to wrap 
themselves in a cocoon to maintain security and privacy, leading to a 
very limited life. The greatest threats to privacy and self-confidence 
today come from government and industry use of technology, which 
59 Cf People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) ("The criminal is to go free be-
cause the constable has blundered."). 
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invades privacy and provides information on the most private aspects 
of one's life. Somehow, the message of Mapp will have to be rein-
vigorated to limit government acquisition and use of such data; pro-
tection from private invasion of informational privacy will require 
legislative action.60 
II. MAPP AND RACE 
The impact of Mapp was naturally greatest in the Mrican-
American community where Fourth Amendment violations were the 
most common. Whatever limited effect Mapp would have, it would 
be felt most where police conduct was the least restrained. It was this 
community which the Warren Court intended to benefit by the due 
process revolution, because wherever injustice existed in America, its 
worst impact was felt in the black community. 
The Mapp decision went hand-in-hand with Brown v. Board of 
Education and other decisions of the Warren Court seeking to elimi-
nate legal barriers to racial justice. In Brown it was the laws that 
mandated racial segregation; in Mapp it was the underlying law en-
forcement culture in the country that tolerated and encouraged police 
to treat African-Americans and other racial minorities differently 
from the majority population. And different meant worse. The police 
were not unique in this regard; they were part of the racist culture that 
permeated American life and that has not yet disappeared. The im-
pact of the racist culture on relations between police and Mrican-
Americans is readily apparent throughout American history. The 
white police officers who invaded Dollree Mapp's home did so with 
confidence that they would not be called to task for violating her fun-
damental rights by entering her home without a warrant. How the 
police behaved in Dollree Mapp's house was consistent with histori-
cal practice in the United States. 
Since before the founding of the Republic, law enforcement offi-
cers were used primarily to track the movements of Mrican-
Americans and to ensure their subservience. Prior to the Civil War, it 
mattered little whether the African-American was a slave or a free-
man. Sheriffs and other law enforcement officers treated them the 
same, thereby reducing the Negro freeman to slave status in the eyes 
of the law. The Civil War changed little in that regard. In the South, 
after Reconstruction precipitously ended, sheriffs and their deputies, 
as well as police in the cities, were the instrument of repression, 
60 The Fourth Amendment only protects against governmental intrusions of privacy, not 
private intrusions of privacy. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) ("The 
Fourth Amendment gives protection against un!a wfu1 searches and seizures, and as shown in the 
previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action."). 
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working hand-in-hand with nightriders who would keep the African-
American population terrorized and subservient. Police failed to pre-
vent lynchings or apprehend the perpetrators. 
Even in the North, the African-American population received 
very different justice on the street than whites. While relations be-
tween police and all citizens on the street during the first six decades 
of the twentieth century were rough and characterized by arbitrary 
overreaching by police, the full brunt of police lawlessness and 
brutality fell on the African-American community. Arbitrarily 
stopping and detaining African-Americans,61 engaging in dragnet 
arrests of African-Americans,62 and, as in the Mapp case, entering 
homes without warrants, police ensured that African-Americans were 
second-class citizens, receiving rougher justice than that accorded the 
rest of the population. Police brutality towards African-Americans 
was as common in the North as in the South. And the criminal justice 
system, then as now, meted out disproportionately harsher penalties to 
African-American defendants than it did to white defendants.63 
The Warren Court's due process revolution sought to achieve a 
more level playing field in state criminal proceedings by applying the 
procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights to state criminal cases. 
Mapp also sought to achieve justice on the streets by imposing the 
exclusionary rule on state criminal proceedings to discourage police 
from violating Fourth Amendment rights. 
Whatever effect Mapp may have had on the streets immediately 
after 1961, that effect was, at the very least, diminished after 1968. In 
1968, the same Warren Court, in Terry v. Ohio,64 reacting to growing 
national concern about increases in crime, sanctioned seizures of the 
person on less than probable cause required for arrest. The Terry in-
vestigative stop requires a lesser standard than probable cause, 
61 See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While 
Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REv. 265, 266 (1999) (discussing the police practice of arbitrarily 
stopping and detaining African-American motorists simply because of their race). 
62 See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 722 (1969) (noting that in investigating a rape 
where the victim could only describe her assailant as a "Negro youth," the police, without war-
rants, rounded up at least twenty-four African-American youths and took them to police head-
quarters for questioning and fmgerprinting before releasing them without filing charges). 
63 See Harris, supra note 61, at 297-304 (discussing the disproportionate effect of the 
criminal justice system on blacks); Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Racial Disparities in Sentencing: Can 
Sentencing Reforms Reduce Discrimination in Punishment?, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 781, 802-07 
(1993) (detailing a statistical analysis of sentencing disparities based upon race and recommend-
ing changes in mandatory sentencing schemes); Laura A. Wytsma, Comment, Punishment for 
"Just Us"-A Constitutional Analysis of the Crack Cocaine Sentencing Statutes, 3 GEO. MA-
SON INDEPENDENT L. REv. 473, 496 (1995) (discussing the disparate treatment of mandatory 
crack and powder cocaine sentences). 
64 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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namely reasonable suspicion, to justify an investigative detention. 65 
Moreover, in the hands of a Supreme Court less sensitive to minority 
concerns during the subsequent thirty years, the Teny stop, which the 
Warren Court acknowledged is a Fourth Amendment seizure, 66 grew 
in its impact on the African-American community. The area in which 
a stop takes place, such as a "high-crime area," became a factor in 
determining the reasonableness of a stop, thereby making inner-city 
residents far more subject to these stops than other citizens. 67 While 
race is not a constitutionally acceptable factor in determining reason-
ableness, and thus the legitimacy of the investigative stop, "high 
crime area" often is a euphemism for race, legitimizing race as a con-
sideration. 
No one knows, for certain, whether the decision in Terry repre-
sented a loss of courage and commitment by the Warren Court to 
equal justice on the streets. These stops, though illegal, were com-
mon prior to the Court's decision in Terry. 68 The Court may have 
legitimized them in order to get control by putting them within the 
framework of the Fourth Amendment. However, the cost of provid-
ing this tool to help law enforcement prevent crime has grown over 
the years. The momentary detention allowed and envisaged by Chief 
Justice Warren in Terry has grown under the Burger and Rehnquist 
65 After reviewing the underlying justifications of the Fourth Amendment and the needs of 
the police, the Supreme Court held that: 
Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case 
leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a rea-
sonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has rea-
son to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless 
of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer 
need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a 
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that 
his safety or that of others was in danger. And in determining whether the officer 
acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his incho-
ate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to the specific reasonable infer-
ences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. 
!d. at 27 (citations omitted). 
66 See id. at 16 ("There is some suggestion in the use of such terms as 'stop' and 'frisk' 
that such police conduct is outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment because neither action 
rises to the level of 'search' or 'seizure' within the meaning of the Constitution. We emphati-
cally reject this notion."). 
67 See State v. Bobo, 524 N.E.2d 489, 493-94 (Ohio 1988) (Wright, J., dissenting) ("In 
every metropolitan area in this nation, there are neighborhoods where illegal drug sales run 
rampant and many of the residents are armed and ready for trouble. . . . I cannot see how we 
can create what amounts to a 'high crime area' exception to the protections extended by the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments."). 
68 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 n.ll (noting that the practice of stopping and frisking, while 
varying from locale to locale, exacerbates police-community tensions). 
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Courts to allow for longer detentions and the use of substantial force 
absent probable cause to justify a full-fledged arrest.69 
Worse, the later Courts narrowed the category of Terry-stop by 
expanding another category, "consensual encounters" between police 
and citizens, which implicate no Fourth Amendment rights and, thus, 
provide for no Fourth Amendment oversight of the reasonableness of 
the police conduct.70 The "consensual encounter" is predicated upon 
the Supreme Court's conclusion that no reasonable innocent person 
would believe that he is not free to leave rather than comply with a 
police officer's request that the person stop and provide information, 
even though it is patently obvious that no reasonable innocent person, 
not schooled in the fine points of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
would feel free to disregard a police officer under most of these cir-
cumstances.71 It is little wonder, then, that issues such as racial pro-
filing have reached the political radar. Racial profiling by police72 is 
an issue that actually predates the founding of the Republic,73 but it 
has become such a wide-spread negation of basic Fourth Amendment 
rights that its existence imperils not only the people who are subject 
to such interference because of race or ethnicity but the liberty of all 
Americans. If the nation continues to disregard, and thus ratify, this 
injustice, it raises questions about the security of all Americans from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
By controlling movement, you control behavior. Mapp essen-
tially protects freedom of movement from unreasonable interference 
by police. By making unreasonable interference with the movement 
69 See LEWJS R. KATZ, OHIO ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 15.6 (2000) (discussing 
the length and duration of a Terry detentionj. 
70 See Florida v. Rodriquez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1984) ("The initial contact between the 
officers and respondent, where they simply asked if he would step aside and talk with them, was 
clearly the sort of consensual encounter that implicates no Fourth Amendment interest."); 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 544 (1980) ("As long as the person to whom ques-
tions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion 
upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particular-
ized and objective justification."). 
71 See United States v. Notarianni, 729 F.2d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1984) (Cudahy, J., dissent-
ing) ("It is perfectly appropriate to indulge what may be a modest fiction that a person being 
casually questioned by a policeman about possible criminal activity feels entirely free to say 
nothing and move on."). 
72 See Harris, supra note 61, at 270-73 (presenting three individual accounts and their 
impact on the participants, the results of statistical analyses establishing the existence of racial 
profiling, and the consequences of such a policy); Adero S. Jernigan, Student Article, Driving 
While Black: Racial Profiling in America, 24 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 127 (2000) (discussing 
racial profiling and the Supreme Court's decision in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 
(1996)). 
73 See HERBERT S. KLEIN, SLAVERY IN THE AMERlCAS 40-57 (1967) (chronicling the 
history and the gradual shift to complete enslavement of the African-American population in 
Virginia prior to the Revolutionary War); Jernigan, supra note 72, at 128-29 (reviewing the 
history of police targeting of minorities in the United States since the 1600s). 
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of African-Americans, like all Americans, costly to the government 
by denying it the use of evidence found during such interference, 
Mapp helped to promote the freedom of movement for all Americans. 
However, Mapp especially promoted the freedom of movement for 
African-Americans who were subject to harassment and other unrea-
sonable interference more than most Americans. Terry and its prog-
eny expanded the opportunities for police interference with African-
Americans' freedom of movement. It further expanded police inter-
ference by allowing the area where a stop takes place to be a positive 
factor in determining the reasonableness of a stop. This. increases the 
opportunities for stops in the inner cities, where most people stopped 
will be African-Americans or other minorities. While the courts say 
"area" alone is not enough, area "alone" is often coupled with other, 
innocuous factors. 74 The net result is subjecting people in the inner 
cities, most of whom are not and have never been involved in crimi-
nal activity, to constant police interference in their movements in 
ways, degrees, and frequency unknown by the rest of America. The 
Terry stop, and its expansion, as well as the expansion of unregulated 
consensual encounters, has muted Mapp' s message, especially on the 
streets of inner-city communities where African-Americans continue 
to be stopped and hassled by police much more so than in other com-
munities. It is not surprising that the message has been muted. The 
Warren Court saw the need to ensure the quality of justice for those in 
this country who were denied it. The successor Courts have not been 
attuned to this need but, instead, have used their powers to accommo-
date law enforcement convenience by expanding police authority to 
intervene without prior judicial authorization and without exigent cir-
cumstances, which traditionally provided the justification for war-
rantless intrusions. 75 
CONCLUSION 
It would be wrong for the reader to conclude that I think that 
Mapp after forty years has made little difference in the due process 
equation. The rule in Mapp continues to be enforced most fully when 
the police intrusion takes place in a home, which is precisely the fact 
situation presented in Mapp v. Ohio. The Supreme Court, even the 
74 See State v. Bobo, 524 N.E.2d 489, 491 (Ohio 1988) (finding that the high-crime loca-
tion, coupled with such factors as the time of day, the experience of the officers, furtive gestures 
by the individual, and the fact that the officers were out of their vehicle, justified the investiga-
tive stop). 
75 See Lewis R. Katz, United States v. Ross: Evolving Standards for Warrantless 
Searches, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 172, 189 (1983) (discussing the change in the Su-
preme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence holding that police inconvenience did not 
justify bypassi~g the constitutional requirements for searches and seizures). 
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post-Warren Court, zealously protects the Fourth Amendment rights 
of Americans in their homes, except when it comes to allowing the 
prosecution to use evidence secured with an illegal search warrant 
that was "reasonably relied upon" by the police. 
It is on the streets of America where the message of Mapp has 
been muted. Nonetheless, despite the continued lack of equal justice 
on the streets and the weakening of the protections of the exclusion-
ary rule, and consequently the weakening of Fourth Amendment 
rights outside of the home, Mapp continues to have symbolic effect. 
Every time a court rules that reliable and relevant evidence of guilt 
must be suppressed, resulting sometimes in the dismissal of charges 
against a likely guilty defendant, we are reminded that the cost of 
maintaining individual liberties is substantial. Mapp made us con-
front those costs on a regular basis in every court in the land. It 
makes us reaffrrm our commitment to liberty in a tough, tangible way. 
Someday a future Supreme Court-now farther than ever in the 
future-must confront the costs to liberty of the dilution of Mapp and 
the resulting expansion of police power, especially as a result of the 
"war on drugs." Until that day, when our society finally chooses to 
admit to and deal with the reality of unequal justice on the streets of 
America, the impact of Mapp will remain largely symbolic. 
